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Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire: How 
VerbaL DecePtion cues signaL 
DecePtiVe Versus Honest imPression 
management anD inFLuence 
interView ratings
Lenke Roth1, Ute-Christine Klehe1, and Gloria Willhardt1
1. Work and Organizational Psychology, Justus-Liebig-University Giessen
A longstanding concern in employment interviewing 
is candidates’ impression management (IM). The use of 
IM can be understood in terms of signaling theory, which 
argues that a signaler (candidates) may intentionally adjust 
the signals sent to a receiver (interviewers; Bangerter et al., 
2012; Roulin et al., 2016). More specifically, candidates 
may fake—that is, consciously misrepresent their skills, 
abilities, and other favorable characteristics (deceptive 
IM)—and/or they may present themselves honestly (honest 
IM; Bourdage et al., 2018; Levashina & Campion, 2006; 
Roulin et al., 2016). If candidates fake successfully, this 
provides an undue advantage for fakers over honest candi-
dates and threatens the interview’s criterion-related validity. 
In short, interviewers need to differentiate deceptive from 
honest signals to detect candidates’ faking. Consequently, 
the interview requires interviewers to interpret whatever 
signal—intended or unintended—they receive (Connelly et 
al., 2011).
Fortunately, research on lie detection suggests that de-
ceptive IM might show, at least in theory (Vrij et al., 2010, 
2019): When people lie, they send unintended negative sig-
nals that may give away their untruthfulness. Unfortunate-
ly, many such clues have failed to translate into interview 
settings (Roulin & Powell, 2018; Schneider et al., 2015). 
What still appears promising to study are certain verbal 
cues: a lower plausibility of responses and more verbal 
uncertainties (DePaulo et al., 2003) that may help to “set 
liars’ pants on fire.” Therefore, we aim to capture differenc-
es in verbal deception cues between deceptive and honest 
IM and study these cues’ effects on interviewers’ ratings of 
candidates’ responses.
The current study makes the following three contri-
butions. First, we contribute to research on deceptive and 
honest IM in interviews. Past research on IM’s effects on 
interview performance (Melchers et al., 2020) yielded 
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ABSTRACT
KEYWORDS
Impression management (IM), especially deceptive IM (faking), is a cause for concern in 
selection interviews. The current study combines findings on lie detection with signaling 
theory to address how candidates’ deceptive versus honest IM shows in verbal deception 
cues, which then relate to interview ratings of candidates’ interview performance. After 
completing a structured interview rated by two trained interviewers, 182 candidates 
reported their deceptive and honest IM. Verbal deception cues (plausibility, verbal 
uncertainty) were coded from video recordings. Results supported the hypotheses: 
Deceptive IM directly raised interviewer ratings (intended positive signal) but lowered the 
responses’ plausibility and enhanced verbal uncertainties (unintended negative signals). 
Honest IM raised responses’ plausibility. Plausibility related positively to interviewer ratings 
(receiver reaction), thus accounting for a negative indirect effect of deceptive IM and a 
positive indirect effect of honest IM on interviewer ratings. This study contributes to theory 
and practice regarding faking detection in employment interviews.
impression 
management, signaling 
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Levashina & Campion, 2007), no (e.g., Bourdage et al., 
2018), or negative relationships between deceptive IM and 
interview performance (e.g., Swider et al., 2011). We aim 
to contribute to this debate by addressing deceptive versus 
honest IM from a signaling perspective. Candidates use 
both honest and deceptive IM to signal their suitability. Yet, 
deceptive IM evokes unintended negative signals that may 
reduce interview ratings and thus neutralize faking effec-
tiveness. For practice, we aim to show how small verbal 
cues reveal deceptive IM. Second, the study adds to the 
literature on signaling theory. Although the theory includes 
unintended negative signals, empirical research on such 
signals is still rare (Connelly et al., 2011). The current study 
offers a well-founded operationalization of such phenome-
na by borrowing from research on lie detection. Third and 
final, the study may add to the literature on structured inter-
views. One of this literature’s truisms is the reliance on pre-
determined scoring guides based on a job analysis (Campion 
et al., 1997). The current study identifies verbal cues not 
included in such scoring guides that may yet be informative 
for good conceptual reasons.
Signaling Theory and Impression Management (IM)
Signaling theory describes how two parties with asym-
metric knowledge exchange information (Connelly et al., 
2011). The idea is that one party (signaler) is an insider 
with positive and negative information about something of 
interest, like a product, a person, or an organization (e.g., 
Mavlanova et al., 2012). The other party (receiver) is an 
outsider, who does not have but needs this unbiased infor-
mation to make a good decision on their own.
The issue is that the signaler may not be neutral and 
might benefit from the decision leaning one way or another. 
Consequently, the signaler might not want to convey all in-
formation equally. They may only present information pos-
itive to their cause (i.e., positive signals) while choosing to 
omit negative information (i.e., negative signals; Connelly 
et al., 2011). In other words, the signaler might benefit from 
a selective presentation of information and possibly even 
deceit at the receiver’s expense (e.g., Bird & Smith, 2005). 
When successful, the signaler may even direct the receiver 
toward a decision that the receiver might not have made 
had they known all the information available (Connelly et 
al., 2011).
Receivers are not necessarily naïve toward the signal-
er’s interests but must be attentive to both intended and 
unintended signals that speak for or against the signaler’s 
veracity.
Signaling theory has been influential in domains as di-
verse as marketing (e.g., Dunham, 2011), strategic entrepre-
neurship (Connelly et al., 2011), and selection and recruit-
ment (e.g., Wilhelmy et al., 2019). Employment interviews 
are classic situations of information asymmetry between 
candidates and interviewers. Candidates are insiders to their 
own strengths and weaknesses. Interviewers are outsiders 
who need unbiased information on candidates to decide 
whether to hire them or not. This asymmetry both invites 
candidates to shape the signals they send about how they 
like to be perceived (Bangerter et al., 2012) and requires in-
terviewers to interpret whatever signals they receive (Con-
nelly et al., 2011). Most candidates intentionally employ 
IM to signal that they are suitable candidates (Roulin et 
al., 2016). Yet, depending on whether candidates’ IM is de-
ceptive or honest, they may also send unintentional signals 
(e.g., deception cues versus signals of credibility/veracity/
reliability; cf., Connelly et al., 2011; DePaulo et al., 2003).
IM as Intended Positive Signals
Interviews offer external candidates unique opportuni-
ties to signal their suitability for the job in question (Ban-
gerter et al., 2012). Interviews thus invite IM, the manipula-
tion of the impression that candidates make on interviewers 
(Levashina & Campion, 2006). In terms of signaling theory, 
candidates’ IM usually implies sending intentional positive 
signals about oneself (cf., Roulin et al., 2016). These sig-
nals can be deceptive and/or honest IM.
Deceptive IM. Deceptive IM (i.e., faking) is common 
in interviews (Levashina & Campion, 2007). With decep-
tive IM, candidates intentionally and deceptively attempt 
to misrepresent themselves (Levashina & Campion, 2006; 
Roulin et al., 2016). Tactics include slight and extensive im-
age creation (exaggerating existing experiences and actions, 
and/or claiming experiences and accomplishments that one 
does not have), deceptive ingratiation (wrongly claiming 
to hold the same values or attitudes as the interviewer or 
organization), and image protection (omitting or concealing 
undesirable information; Levashina & Campion, 2007).
Honest IM. Honest IM is a form of honest self-presen-
tation by which candidates truthfully describe and express 
their job-related abilities, accomplishments, experiences, 
attitudes, or values (Bourdage et al., 2018). Honest IM 
encompasses honest self-promotion (emphasizing existing 
skills and experiences; Bourdage et al., 2018), honest ingra-
tiation (voicing appreciation and highlighting their similar 
values to the organization or interviewer; Kristof-Brown et 
al., 2002), and honest defensive IM (image protection via 
sincere apologies, excuses, and justifications; Bolino et al., 
2008).
Effects of IM on interview ratings. In terms of signal-
ing theory, both deceptive and honest IM aim to convince 
the receiver of the sender’s suitability (Connelly et al., 
2011). They thus likely foster interviewers’ ratings of candi-
dates’ responses. Empirically, relationships between decep-
tive IM and interviewers’ ratings range from small negative 
to moderate positive correlations (Melchers et al., 2020). 
Some of this variance in findings might be methodological 
though, with not all studies assessing faking directly af-
Personnel Assessment And decisions
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ter the interview but sometimes days or weeks later (e.g., 
Bourdage et al., 2018). Studies assessing faking directly 
after the interview tend to report more positive relationships 
(cf., Buehl & Melchers, 2017; Ingold et al., 2015). Hon-
est IM shows an overall positive relationship to interview 
ratings and hiring recommendations (e.g., Bourdage et al., 
2018; Kleinmann & Klehe, 2010; Roulin et al., 2014), even 
though these benefits seem to flatten out with excessive IM 
(Robie et al., 2020). We thus assume that:
Hypothesis 1: Candidates’ (a) deceptive IM and (b) 
honest IM show direct positive relationships with inter-
viewers’ ratings of candidates’ interview performance.
Deception Cues as Unintended Negative Signals
Nobody wants to fall prey to a liar. In the language of 
signaling theory, the receiver depends on the signaler pro-
viding unbiased information for making a good decision 
but may also know that the signaler has a vested interest in 
that decision. In short, the receiver may attend not only to 
the intended signals that the signaler provides but also to 
unintended ones about the signaler’s credibility.
Unintentional deception cues may emerge in verbal or 
nonverbal behavior (DePaulo et al., 2003) or in the content 
of what people say (e.g., criteria-based content analysis, 
CBCA; Amado et al., 2016). Translating this to the se-
lection context, Culbertson et al. (2016) explicitly asked 
participants to lie or tell the truth in a mock employment 
interview. Under the lying condition, interviewers indeed 
spotted participants who showed various deception cues. 
However, explicitly asking participants to lie may over-
estimate faking results (cf., Birkeland et al., 2006). Stud-
ies observing the more nuanced and subtle deceptive IM 
happening during regular selection interviews (Roulin & 
Powell, 2018; Schneider et al., 2015) yielded less consistent 
results for behavioral cues or CBCA. Behavioral cues may 
simply not work as well during selection as anticipated, or 
the issue was methodological, with raters rating behavioral 
cues only after the complete interview (Schneider et al., 
2015). CBCA, in turn, requires cumbersome interview tran-
scriptions. Again, results were questionable with the overall 
analysis but none of the single criteria correlating with de-
ceptive IM (Roulin & Powell, 2018, Study 2).
Still unaddressed in regular interviews are verbal de-
ception cues, most prominently plausibility and verbal 
uncertainty (DePaulo et al., 2003). DePaulo et al. (2003), 
define a response as “plausible” if the rater considers the 
message plausible, likely, or believable. The underlying 
idea is that the rater mentally imagines the scenario that the 
interviewee describes in an interview response and assesses 
whether this scenario is coherent with the rater’s own prior 
knowledge or experience (Connell & Keane, 2006). Appar-
ently, different raters agree on what responses they consider 
plausible or not (Vrij et al., in press). Studies that randomly 
asked participants to lie or tell the truth suggest plausibility 
to help identify lies (e.g., Culbertson et al., 2016; Vrij et al., 
2020). However, we still need further proof of the relation-
ship between plausibility ratings and deceptive IM in regu-
lar interviews (cf., Culbertson et al., 2016).
Verbal uncertainties are defined as the interviewee ap-
pearing uncertain, insecure, not very assertive, and having 
difficulty responding to the question (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
Uncertainty reveals itself in the interviewee repeating 
phrases, breaking phrases apart, or including half phrases 
in their responses (Kraut, 1978). Vrij and Heaven (1999) 
experimentally showed that lying alters participants’ speech 
patterns. Participants had more difficulties expressing them-
selves, for example, repeating themselves, forgetting words, 
or whole phrases, when lying. These speech errors are dis-
tinct from slips of the tongue, as participants did not stutter 
more often or use more filler words when lying than when 
telling the truth.
If the validity of verbal deception cues generalizes 
across contexts (Vrij et al., 2019), these cues can help iden-
tify deceptive IM in employment interviews. They may thus 
present unintended, yet externally observable, signals of 
candidates’ lacking credibility.
Hypothesis 2: The more candidates employ deceptive 
IM, (a) the less plausible their responses will be and (b) 
the more verbal uncertainties they will show.
Regarding honest IM, we assume opposite effects. 
Although honest and deceptive IM correlate positively 
(Bourdage et al., 2018), honest IM implies that candidates 
draw from actual attitudes, experiences, and accomplish-
ments. With no need to hastily construct a story, candidates’ 
speech likely is more fluent. They may offer up details and 
information that allow a more complete and thus plausible 
picture of their responses than if they had remained silent, 
thus (unintentionally) signaling credibility and poise (cf., 
Durcikova & Gray, 2009). Therefore, we assume:
 
Hypothesis 3: The more candidates employ honest IM, 
(a) the more plausible their responses will be and (b) 
the less verbal uncertainties they will show.
Impact of Unintended Signals on Interview Ratings
Low plausibility and high verbal uncertainties may 
not only be unintended but may also function as negative 
signals to interviewers regarding candidates’ credibility 
and thus suitability (cf., Connelly et al., 2011). Classic 
scoring recommendations instruct interviewers to focus 
solely on the content-related fit of candidates’ responses to 
a standardized job-related scoring guide (e.g., Latham et 
al., 1980). Nevertheless, we assume interviewers will react 
negatively to either deception cue. If a candidate’s response 
lacks plausibility or if the candidate appears to have diffi-
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culties expressing what they want to convey, interviewers 
might be more skeptical about the response and rate it low-
er. Although not addressed in previous research, such an 
assumption fits practical recommendations. These advise 
candidates to ensure a (verbal and vocal) self-assured ap-
pearance and their statements’ plausibility to improve the 
interviewers’ impression (cf., Dondolo & Chinyamurindi, 
2018; Hebbani & Frey, 2007).
Hypothesis 4: (a) The plausibility of candidates’ re-
sponses will be positively related to, and (b) verbal un-
certainties in candidates’ responses will be negatively 
related to, interviewers’ ratings of candidates’ interview 
performance.
In summary, we suggest a model with direct and, in 
part, opposing indirect effects. Both deceptive and honest 
IM may serve as direct positive signals advertising the 
candidates’ suitability (Hypothesis 1). However, deceptive 
(versus honest) IM may cause subtle verbal deception cues, 
unintended negative signals of lacking credibility, which 
may impair interviewers’ impressions of candidates’ suit-
ability (Hypotheses 2 to 4). Taken together, Hypotheses 2 
to 4 thus suggest a negative indirect effect from deceptive 
IM on interview rating and a positive indirect effect from 
honest IM on interview performance via the  verbal decep-
tion cues plausibility and verbal uncertainties.
METHOD
Setting and Design
We conducted the study as a simulated selection pro-
cedure, serving as a training program for prospective uni-
versity graduates. This well-established research paradigm 
in personnel selection facilitates the honest assessment 
of candidates’ cognitions and actions (Kleinmann et al., 
2011), including faking (e.g., Dürr & Klehe, 2018), in a 
realistic context. Prior research has shown that participants 
experience these simulations as realistic, behave like they 
would during actual personnel selection (Kleinmann & 
Ingold, 2019), and that findings from simulations replicate 
to actual field settings (e.g., Ingold et al., 2016; Roulin & 
Powell, 2018). Candidates underwent a classic structured 
panel interview with two interviewers. Although there 
was no job at stake, all interviews were recorded on video, 
and the top 10% well-performing candidates received €25 
each to increase candidates’ level of motivation. After the 
interview, candidates learned that the ensuing survey only 
served research purposes. They then reported their level of 
deceptive and honest IM during the interview. Plausibility 
and verbal uncertainty were coded from video recordings 
of the interviews. All parties involved, that is, candidates, 
interviewers, and the video rater, were blind to the study’s 
purpose and to the content and level of ratings provided by 
any of the other parties involved.
Sample/Candidates
Candidates (N = 182; 101 women, 78 men, three di-
verse; average age = 23.13 years) were recruited via the 
university’s Career Centre. Most studied business (n = 
101), followed by psychology (n = 24) and modern lan-
guages and cultures (n = 14). About two-thirds were com-
pleting their bachelor’s degree (n = 134), the others their 
master’s (n = 48). Only a few candidates reported prior 
experiences with structured selection interviews containing 
behavioral and/or situational questions (n = 15).
Interviewers
Interviewers (N = 21; 16 women, 5 men) were grad-
uate students specializing in work and organizational 
psychology. Through random selection, two interviewers 
per interview rated each candidates’ responses. They were 
extensively trained in the theory and practice of structured 
interviewing, particulary that of the current study.
Rater of Deception Cues
An independent graduate student in work and organi-
zational psychology was trained to code for plausibility and 
verbal uncertainty from the interviews’ video recordings. 
For comparison purposes, this rater also coded similar 
cues that do not signal deception (slips of the tongue; Vrij 
& Heaven, 1999) as well as nonverbal deception cues and 
content analysis criteria.
Measures
Deceptive IM. Candidates responded to Dürr and Kle-
he’s (2018) 17-item short version of Levashina and Cam-
pion’s (2007) Interview Faking Scale (e.g., “I claimed that 
I have skills that I do not have”) on a 5-point Likert scale 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree (α = .91).
Honest IM. Candidates responded to 10 items from 
Bourdage et al.’s (2018) honest IM section of the Short IM 
Scale (e.g., “I brought up my past work experience to make 
the interviewer aware of my competence”) on a 5-point 
Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree (α = 
.79).
Deception cues. The video rater coded the plausibility 
and verbal uncertainty in real time. For every interview 
question, the rater recorded on a tablet whenever the respec-
tive cue was present, that is, whenever candidates provided 
a plausible response or showed difficulties in expressing 
themselves. Following DePaulo et al. (2003), a response 
was “plausible” if the rater considered the message plau-
sible, likely, or believable, that is, if they could mentally 
imagine the scenario that a candidate described, and as-
sessed this scenario as coherent with their prior knowledge 
or experience (α = .89). Verbal uncertainties were defined 
as candidates appearing uncertain, insecure, or not very 
Personnel Assessment And decisions
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assertive, and seeming to have difficulty responding to the 
question, for example, repeating their phrases, breaking 
phrases apart, or forgetting words (α = .74).1 This coding 
procedure served to gain more objective information about 
the cues than a general rating at the end of the interview. 
Videos were played at normal speed without the possibility 
of pausing to maintain comparability with the actual inter-
view.
A comparison with 30 interview codings by another 
independent rater suggested a perfect agreement on a ques-
tion level of 59.16% for plausibility and 69.17% for verbal 
uncertainty and moderate interrater reliabilities for both 
plausibility (ICC = .51) and verbal uncertainty (ICC = .68; 
Koo & Li, 2016).
Interview ratings. The interview was fully standard-
ized, nontransparent, and consisted of six behavioral (Janz, 
1982) and six situational questions (Latham et al., 1980). 
Mirroring Kolk et al.’s (2004) feeling–thinking–power 
taxonomy, each interview question targeted one of the di-
mensions of cooperation, planning, and leadership, three of 
the five most frequent dimensions in structured interviews 
(Huffcutt et al., 2001). Because the simulated selection 
procedure was for university graduates, the behavioral 
questions addressed situations in a university context. The 
situational questions addressed problems encountered by an 
organizational management trainee. Interviewers took ex-
tensive notes and rated each response on a classic behavior 
rating scale with examples for poor (rating of 1), average 
(rating of 3), and outstanding (rating of 5) responses (α = 




A confirmatory factor analysis in Mplus 8.2 (Muthén 
& Muthén, 1998–2018) based on parcels (item-to-construct 
relations method; Little et al., 2002) supported the proposed 
measurement model with three latent factors (deceptive IM, 
honest IM, interview ratings) and two single-item indicators 
(plausibility, verbal uncertainty). With average factor load-
ings ranging from .70 (interview ratings) to .92 (deceptive 
IM), the model showed an excellent fit (χ2(36) = 34.68, p = 
.531, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .04).
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and bivariate 
correlations between study variables. Both IM forms tended 
to relate positively to interview ratings, even though this 
relationship was only statistically significant for deceptive 
IM. Women and older candidates tended to score better than 
men and younger candidates.2 
Hypothesis Testing
We tested hypotheses via structural equation modeling 
with Mplus 8.2 using maximum likelihood estimation and 
bootstrapping (10,000 draws). The proposed model showed 
an excellent fit (χ2(37) = 36.85, p = .476, CFI = 1.00, RM-
SEA = .00, SRMR = .04) and did not differ from the mea-
surement model (∆χ2(1) = 2.17, p = .141). Figure 1 shows 
standardized model coefficients and Table 2 direct, indirect, 
and total effects of deceptive and honest IM on interview 
ratings.
Supporting Hypothesis 1a, deceptive IM showed a di-
rect positive relationship with interview ratings. Rejecting 
Hypothesis 1b, no such relationship emerged for honest IM.
Supporting Hypothesis 2, deceptive IM showed a nega-
tive relationship with plausibility and a positive relationship 
with verbal uncertainty.
Supporting Hypothesis 3a, honest IM showed a posi-
tive relationship with plausibility. Rejecting Hypothesis 3b, 
no such relationship emerged for verbal uncertainty.
Supporting Hypothesis 4a, plausibility showed a posi-
tive relationship with interview ratings. Rejecting Hypothe-
sis 4b, no such relationship emerged for verbal uncertainty.
Taken together, the indirect effects from IM on in-
terview ratings via verbal deception cues revealed that 
deceptive IM had a significant negative and honest IM a 
significant positive indirect effect on interview ratings via 
plausibility. The indirect effects via verbal uncertainty were 
not significant (Table 2).
Additional Analyses
To ensure that effects are not due to a single subfacet 
of deceptive or honest IM, we reran analyses with each IM 
subfacet separately instead of the overall value. Most re-
sults also generalized across subfacets (Table 3). Different 
deceptive IM facets related negatively to plausibility (effect 
sizes ranging from –.16 for slight image creation to –.25 for 
extensive image creation). Plausibility, in turn, accounted 
for a significant negative indirect relationship between all 
deceptive IM facets and interviewer ratings. Different de-
ceptive IM facets related positively to verbal uncertainty 
(effect sizes ranging from –.20 for deceptive ingratiation to 
–.36 for image protection). The positive direct effect of 
deceptive IM on interview ratings only held for deceptive 
ingratiation and image protection. For slight and extensive 
image creation, this effect pointed in the proposed direction 
but was not significant. The results for honest IM’s subfac-
ets were also similar to those reported in the overall analy-
ses. Honest IM related positively to plausibility (effect sizes 
1    To ensure that, compared to earlier research, possible findings 
are truly related to the type of deception cue studied and not to our 
measurement approach, the rater also coded nonverbal (eye con-
tact, smiling, nodding, head movement, hand gesture; cf., Schnei-
der et al., 2015) and CBCA cues (logical structure, descriptions of 
interactions, unstructured production, spontaneous corrections; cf., 
Roulin et al., 2018) with the same real-time coding. Like Schneider 
et al. (2015) and Roulin et al. (2018), we found no relationships be-
tween deceptive IM and these cues (Table S1 in the Supplementary 
Materials).
2    Rerunning analyses with gender and age as control variables 
yielded stable results regarding our hypotheses with neither gen-
der (γ = –.11, p = .223, 95% CI [–.26, .04]) nor age (γ = .16, p = .131, 
95% CI [–.01, .34]) maintaining their influence on interview ratings.
77
2021 • Issue 1 • 72-82Published By ScholarWorks@BGSU, 2021
Personnel Assessment And decisions liAr, liAr, PAnts on Fire
Variable M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Gendera .44 (.50)   --
2. Age 23.13 (3.15) .03    -- 
3. Deceptive IM 1.93 (.59) –.04 –.18*   --
4. Honest IM 2.71 (.61) .00 .05 .25**          --
5. Plausibility 5.65 (3.95) –.02 .12 –.15* .23**          --
6. Verbal uncertainty 2.55 (2.52) –.09 –.02 .25** –.02 –.16* --
7. Interview ratings 2.69 (.50) –.15* .16* .17* .15 .20** .08
Note. N = 182 except for gender and age (N = 179). a0 = female and 1 = male. IM = impression management. The candidates 
rated their deceptive and honest IM. A rater coded plausibility and verbal uncertainty via video recordings of the interviews. The 
interviewers rated candidates’ responses during the interview. *p < .05. **p < .01.
TABLE 1.
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables
FIGURE 1.
Conceptual Model of How Organizational Culture Affects Faking in Job Interviews 
Note. N = 182. IM = impression management. Model fit indices: χ2(37) = 36.85, p = .476, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, 
SRMR = .04. *p < .05. **p < .01.The candidates rated their deceptive and honest IM. A rater coded plausibility and 
verbal uncertainty via video recordings of the interviews. The interviewers rated candidates’ responses during the in-
terview.
ranging from .18 for honest self-promotion to .29 for honest 
defensive IM). Plausibility, in turn, accounted for a signif-
icant positive indirect effect between all honest IM facets 
and interviewer ratings. Similar to honest IM overall, none 
of the subfacets were directly related to interview ratings.
DISCUSSION
Building on signaling theory, this study aimed to cap-
ture differences in deception cues between deceptive and 
honest IM in a structured interview and to study the effect 
of these cues on how interviewers rate candidates’ respons-
es. As expected, deceptive IM showed in less plausible re-
sponses and more verbal uncertainties, whereas honest IM 
was related to more plausibility. Plausibility of responses 
further related positively to interviewers’ ratings, resulting 
in a negative indirect effect of deceptive IM versus a pos-
itive indirect effect of honest IM on performance ratings. 
Thus, plausibility counteracted the direct positive effect 
of deceptive IM, although it could not negate this direct 
effect. Plausibility also enhanced the direct positive effect 
of honest IM on interview ratings. However, in contrast to 
deceptive IM, honest IM’s total effect on interview ratings 
was not significant.
Personnel Assessment And decisions
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Deceptive IM on interview ratings Honest IM on interview ratings
Estimate SE 95% CI Estimate SE 95% CI
Total effect .18 .09 [.02, .31] .06 .10 [–.11, .23]
Direct effect .24 .10 [.07, .38] –.02 .10 [–.19, .15]
Indirect effects of deceptive IM on interview 
ratings
Indirect effects of honest IM on interview 
ratings
Estimate SE 95% CI Estimate SE 95% CI
Via plausibility –.07 .03 [–.13, –.02] .09 .04 [.03, .15]
Via verbal uncertainty .01 .02 [–.03, .05] .00 .01 [–.02, .01]
Note. N = 182. IM = impression management. Estimate is standardized coefficient. SE = standard error. CI = confidence interval.
TABLE 2.
Direct, Indirect and Total Effects of Impression Management on Rated Interview Ratings
In the words of signaling theory, both deceptive and 
honest IM implied that candidates intentionally sent pos-
itive signals to interviewers about their suitability, even 
though only deceptive and not honest IM seems to have 
directly influenced interviewers. Yet, with deceptive IM, 
unintended signals indirectly counteract some of the desired 
effect. Unlike honest IM, deceptive IM decreased the plau-
sibility of responses, a hard-to-fake signal of candidates’ 
credibility. Crafting a coherent, plausible story directly 
while talking is challenging if the story is untrue (cf., Ban-
gerter et al., 2012; Cronk, 2005). Although not necessarily 
consciously, interviewers may interpret low plausibility as a 
negative signal and reduce their interview ratings.
Verbal uncertainties, in contrast, did not exert such 
signaling effects. Interviewers either did not notice such 
uncertainties or chose not to take them into account, possi-
bly attributing them to candidates’ nervousness or anxiety 
(Campion & Campion, 1987; cf., Vrij et al., 2010) or find-
ing no way to integrate them into a standardized scoring 
guide. Therefore, the indirect path via verbal uncertainties 
did not counteract the direct positive effect of deceptive IM.
With these findings, the study contributes to explain-
ing the mixed effects of deceptive IM. First, by applying 
signaling theory, we showed how faking serves to send the 
positively intended signal of candidates’ suitability but may 
come at the cost of unintended negative signals in the form 
of deception cues. Most importantly, deceptive IM (and its 
subfacets) triggered certain verbal deception cues—lower 
plausibility and more verbal uncertainty—similar to the 
speech pattern found in lies (DePaulo et al., 2003). In com-
parison, honest IM (and its subfacets) enhanced plausibility. 
With this, deception cues reflected the responses’ honesty, 
not the use of IM behavior per se. By showing how verbal 
cues from lie detection generalize to IM in employment in-
terviews, we make lies in personnel selection more quantifi-
able and demonstrate how verbal cues can help distinguish 
deceptive from honest IM. Furthermore, results showed 
how unintended negative signals counteracted the positive 
direct effect of deceptive IM on performance, ensuring that 
deceptive IM forfeits some of its effectiveness due to the 
indirect path via plausibility.
Second, this study adds to the literature on signaling 
theory by including both sides of the signaling timeline (cf., 
Connelly et al., 2011): senders (candidates) and receivers 
(interviewers). Most prior research has only addressed ei-
ther one or the other perspective. Conceptually, we further 
studied a model combining both the intentional positive 
signal that signalers want to send and the cause, shape, and 
consequences of unintentional negative signals that may 
accompany them—a conceptualized but underresearched 
topic in signaling theory (Connelly et al., 2011).
Finally, this study complements the literature on 
structured interviews. We showed that interviewers took 
plausibility into account but neglected verbal uncertainties. 
Despite interview standardization, plausibility influenced 
interviewers’ ratings of candidates’ responses beyond the 
official interview-scoring guide.
In practice, prospective candidates need to know that 
faking shows in small verbal cues, visible in altered speech 
patterns (e.g., lowered plausibility), on which interviewers 
pick up. Therefore, in preparation for job interviews, can-
didates are better off by truthfully assessing their strengths 
and presenting them in the job interview, using honest IM.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Data came from a selection simulation. Though a sim-
ulation, such context reflects a well-established paradigm 
in personnel selection research, with findings usually gen-
eralizable to actual selection situations (Kleinmann et al., 
2011). This context also allows reliable reports of sensitive 
data like candidates’ deceptive and honest IM, which might 
not be directly measurable in field research.
Further, we used a fully structured interview combin-
ing behavioral and situational questions. Although likely 
informative for structured interviews overall, we cannot tell 
how the process may differ between behavioral and situa-
tional questions, nor can we judge our findings’ generaliz-
ability to less structured interviews. A comparison across 
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interview formats may test our findings’ generalizability. 
Previous research suggests structured question formats 
elicit differences in IM (e.g., Peeters & Lievens, 2006) but 
none in verbal deception cues (cf., Culbertson et al., 2016). 
A comparison may also address why interviewers were 
responsive to the signal “plausibility” but not to “verbal un-
certainties.” If the latter is due to the structured interviews’ 
purely task-focused scoring guide, that implies one possible 
downside to this structured approach. Alternatively, if it is 
due to interviewers interpreting verbal uncertainties as a 
sign of nervousness or anxiety (McCarthy & Goffin, 2004), 
this finding should also extend to less structured interviews. 
That said, interview anxiety actually predicts deceptive IM 
(Powell et al., 2020). Future research may try to differen-
tiate how much verbal uncertainty in regular interviews 
reflect interview anxiety versus deception and how far le-
niency toward verbal uncertainties may thus be justified or 
misplaced. 
It might also be interesting to see how consciously in-
terviewers react to such unintended negative signals. Also, 
one might study how extending official scoring guides 
and/or training interviewers to read lower plausibility and 
higher verbal uncertainties as signs of faking impact their 
ability to catch fakers and predict candidates’ later job per-
formance. Alternatively, such steps may also incur other bi-
ases to the interview (e.g., by discriminating against certain 
societal groups).
With our study design, we cannot conclude as to where 
in the process verbal uncertainties work or do not as an 
unintended signal because we coded verbal deception cues 
and interview ratings independently from each other. This 
prevents common method bias but does not allow us to 
draw direct conclusions of how aware interviewers were of 
candidates’ verbal uncertainties.
In the end, we also do not know why honest IM showed 
no direct positive effect on interview ratings. Besides er-
ror, it may be that among our sample of undergraduate and 
master’s level students, the achievements and experiences 
available to participants to self-promote were simply not 
impressive enough to move interviewers toward higher rat-
ings. If so, then the effects of honest IM may actually grow 
more powerful among more experienced candidates than 
would be suggested by the current results.
Future research might also study whether deception 
cues show specific temporal patterns across a single re-
sponse or across the interview overall. Lying may come 
increasingly fatiguing as the interview continues, possibly 
strengthening the relationships between IM and deception 
cues.
Finally, future research may address moderators that 
enhance or mitigate deceptive IM’s effects on deception 
cues. Traits like psychopathy are strongly related to decep-
tive IM (Roulin & Bourdage, 2017). Also, psychopaths are 
masters at manipulating others (e.g., Smith & Lilienfeld, 
2013), which may be reflected in the assumption that they 
do not show the typical cues that liars show.
Conclusion
This study asked the question of how interviewers 
could “set liars’ pants on fire.” Verbal deception cues of 
plausibility and verbal uncertainties subtly differed between 
deceptive and honest IM. Particularly, plausibility signaled 
to interviewers whether candidates seemed credible. In sum, 
by paying attention to verbal deception cues, interviewers 
may reward candidates’ honest self-presentation and protect 
themselves from falling prey to candidates’ lies.
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